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Abstract: Analytic philosophers have, since the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, emphasized the
contributions of Nyāya philosophers to what contemporary philosophy considers epistemology.
More recently, scholarly work demonstrates the relevance of their ideas to argumentation theory, an
interdisciplinary area of study drawing on epistemology as well as logic, rhetoric, and linguistics.
This paper shows how early Nyāya theorizing about argumentation, from Vātsyāyana to Jayanta
Bhat.t.a, can fruitfully be juxtaposed with the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation pioneered
by Frans van Eemeren. I illustrate the implications of this analysis with a case study from Jayanta
Bhat.t.a’s satirical play, Much Ado about Religion (Āgamad. ambara).
Keywords: Nyāya; argumentation; epistemology; debate; Hinduism; pramān. a
1. Introduction
Among the philosophies of South Asia still making their mark on contemporary
philosophy, the tradition known as “Nyāya” is perhaps one of the most influential. Due
in part to the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, the voices of these philosophers, who
made an indelible impact on Indian philosophy from premodern times up to the present
day, are increasingly made equal interlocutors to epistemologists and philosophers of
mind in the analytic tradition. Yet, despite appreciation of their contributions to what
in Sanskrit was termed pramān. avāda (the study of ways of knowing, pramān. a), and in
modern English, “epistemology”, less philosophical attention is directed towards their
work on what today is known as “argumentation theory”. This is unfortunate. Firstly, the
seminal aphoristic text, the Nyāyasūtra, devotes significant portions to the methodology of
debate discourse (kathā): out of its five chapters (ādhyāyas), each sub-divided into two daily
lessons (āhnikas), this includes the entirety of the fifth chapter and the second daily lesson
in the first. Further, insofar as Nyāya sees itself as a kind of “critical inquiry” (āvı̄ks. ikı̄)
whose written literature engages with interlocutors according to the rules of debate, an
appreciation of argumentation and its interrelationship with epistemology is necessary
for understanding Nyāya philosophy. Finally, while Nyāya epistemology focuses on the
ways in which an individual agent can come to acquire knowledge, the tradition as a
whole prizes collaboration, emphasizing social aspects of knowing: from the traditional
presumption that learning occurs in debate between student and teacher, to the focus on
inference as a set of spoken expressions leading to an interlocutor’s coming to know.
In this paper, I argue that early Nyāya debate theory should be understood as con-
cerned with both the pragmatic effects of speech, including persuasion, as well as epistemic
aims, such as knowledge of the truth. I show how it overlaps with a modern theory, pragma-
dialectics, in its way of approaching argumentation, but with an important difference: it is
explicitly concerned with truth. Further, Nyāya debate can bolster pragma-dialectics in a
key area where the latter is criticized: their focus on rational acceptability which does not
take into account justification (or epistemic aims). On the other hand, pragma-dialectics
can be a useful framework for understanding Nyāya debate in theory and in practice. I
apply pragma-dialectic analysis to an act of Jayanta Bhat.t.a’s Āgamad. ambara (Much Ado
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About Religion). As a result, we can see a range of persuasive strategies which fall within
the rational constraints of Nyāya debate. However, I also show that there is a continu-
ing tension between agonistic debate and truth-seeking debate, even if the possibility of
adversarial debate for truth need not be excluded on rational grounds.
Existing work explaining early Nyāya debate theory often characterizes it as “logic”
(Matilal 1998), though in the broader sense of correct patterns of reasoning and norms
for debate. Solomon (1976) preferred “dialectic” as the umbrella term for the study of
the “nature of argument” which “leads to the rules of debate, logical processes includ-
ing fallacies and finally the nature of knowledge and the concept of truth and validity”
(p. 14). Both (Matilal 1998) and (Solomon 1976) limited themselves to explicating Indian
sources—not only Nyāya philosophers—without significant comparative or constructive
work. In addition, a number of useful historical investigations exist along these lines,
such as (Prets 2001) and (Prets 2003) on fallacious reasoning and (Nicholson 2010) on the
development of early Nyāya debate.
Less common is cross-cultural work, such as (Todeschini 2010), which focused on
how “points of defeat” (nigrahasthānas) in Nyāya debate could be considered through
the lens of Gricean pragmatics. Even (B. Gupta 1980), which considered the question of
whether a kind of faulty reason (hetvābhāsa) constituted a “formal fallacy” as understood in
Aristotelian and contemporary logic, primarily focused on inference as abstracted from
dialectical context. In addition to these efforts, what would be fruitful is work that attends
to dialectical nature of Nyāya debate analysis in tandem with its epistemic concerns, along
the lines of (Lloyd 2011), though with attention not only to the rhetorical, that is, persuasive,
capacity of such debate, but to its truth-conducive, that is, epistemic, capacity.
The identification of compelling similarities and differences, mapped in a way so as
to bring different times and cultures together, is no easy task, and is an important aspect
of doing cross-cultural philosophy. It is part of finding, as Chakrabarti and Weber (2016)
called it, the “space between unrecognizably and unintelligibly alien and boringly familiar”
(p. 18). Thus, this paper aims to map territory and show how Nyāya debate theory and
pragma-dialectic argumentation theory, together, can be illuminating in understanding
how discussions may be simultaneously persuasive and truth-seeking.
Section 2 introduces the early Nyāya philosophers whose work forms the target of
inquiry, arguing that they saw discussion as a paradigmatic, though not strictly necessary,
way for people to acquire knowledge. Section 3 introduces pragma-dialectic argumentation
theory, primarily through the work of Frans van Eemeren, demonstrating overlap and
points of difference between the two methods, arguing that the models can be mutually
beneficial in understanding argumentation: the epistemic concerns of Nyāya bolster weak-
nesses in pragma-dialectics, while pragma-dialectics gives a complementary lens through
which to view the speech acts involved in debate. In Section 4, both theories are brought
together to analyze a debate between a fictionalized Buddhist monk and a Mı̄mām. sā
student in Jayanta’s play. Section 5 concludes with some areas of future research.
2. Early Nyāya Argumentation and Epistemology
2.1. Jayanta Bhat.t.a and the Nyāyasūtra
While periodization such as “early” and “late”, “classical” and “medieval”, is con-
tentious, for the purposes of this article, I focus primarily on so-called “early” Nyāya
philosophers up through Jayanta Bhat.t.a (fl. c. early 9th century).1 Inheriting a pan-Indian
tradition of debate exemplified in literature such as the Upanis.ads and Mahābhārata and
systematized to an extent already in medical literature such as the Carakasam. hitā, the
Nyāyasūtra opens by including three varieties of debate (bolded) in its list of objects which,
when known, are conducive to attaining the “supreme good” or “highest aim” of human
existence, nih. śreyasa.
Epistemic instruments, objects of knowing, doubt, motive, example, accepted
position, inferential components, suppositional reasoning, certainty, discussion
(vāda), disputation (jalpa), wrangling (vitan. d. ā), pseudo-reasons, equivocation,
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misleading objections, and clinchers: from knowledge of these, there is attainment
of the supreme good (nih. śreyasa). NS 1.1.1.2
The relationship between discussion, disputation, and wrangling is subject to some
controversy, in particular whether wrangling is a kind of disputation or not. However,
Table 1 summarizes the basic commitments in our early Nyāya commentaries. Discussion
is a kind of debate in which two opposing claims are evaluated by an exchange of reasons,
in contrast with the other types, in which “tricks” or deceitful uses of fallacious moves may
be deployed in order to acquire victory over one’s interlocutor.
Table 1. Categories of Debate.
Discussion Disputation Wrangling
Proponent Claims p Claims p Claims p
Opponent Claims not-p Claims not-p Criticizes p
Means Rational methods Rational andirrational methods
Rational and
irrational methods
The NS itself, and generations of subsequent commentators, make explicit that the
opening sūtra is not merely a disjointed list of things to know, but an interrelated set of
topics. Understanding and deploying the cognitive tools enumerated here depends on an
appreciation of the parts as well as the study of Nyāya as a whole. Thus, from the outset,
epistemic instruments (also called “knowledge sources” or “ways of knowing”, pramān. as)
are paradigmatically ways to know objects with a moral valence: what is to be avoided or
obtained, in particular, in regard to ethical living and the cessation of suffering in the cycle
of rebirth, by obtaining liberation (apavarga).
Jayanta Bhat.t.a differed from earlier commentators such as Vātsyāyana about Nyāya’s
relationship to the other disciplines (śāstras) and human aims such as liberation. As
(Kataoka 2006) showed, he diverged from the tradition by arguing that Nyāya’s role was
primarily a defensive one, providing argumentative and epistemic tools for removing
doubts about Vedic authority, rather than being a unique way of knowing the objects listed
in NS 1.1.1. Still, all of these philosophers discuss the relationship between knowing—
and its contrary, misapprehension (mithyājñāna)—and ending the cycle of rebirth which
Naiyāyikas accept, of one living self into another body, such as at NS 1.1.2.3 Reasoning
together is one way in which misapprehension can be lifted—whether this happens by
hearing another person’s inference without challenging it (as in the case of “inference-for-
another”,) or by two agents taking up position and counter-position, then engaging in
debate. While discussion may be paradigmatic for the removal of misapprehension (see
also NS 4.2.47–48), it is possible to employ other means to remove faulty ideas. Any of the
ways of knowing, such as perception, can lead to knowledge which then corrects faulty
ideas. For instance, a person misapprehending a tall object in the distance as a post, comes
to know it is a person from genuine perception at a closer position (NBh 4.2.35). However,
for controversial philosophical issues, such as the existence of an eternal, substantial self
(ātman), discussion and inference are crucial.
It may be true, as Nicholson (2010) said, that there is “sedimentation” in the NS
(p. 76) of a prior textual layer of an agonistic debate manual. As a result, perhaps there is
tension between the rhetorical emphasis on norms of debate performance and the epistemic
emphasis on norms of debate rationality. However, both at the level of the sūtra text and
the commentators, there is a serious attempt to bring these together. One interpretation of
the original sūtra structure was, with Potter, that the material on debate is mainly useful as
a way to “illustrate” theories of inference treated elsewhere (Potter 1977, p. 208). However,
this leaves unexplained why debate and its main types are introduced as early as the
first chapter. With (Matilal 1998), rather than seeing an incoherence presupposed by the
structuring of the sūtra, we might see the compiler as introducing the types of debate
early, “in its natural home, in the context of the discussion of the pramān. as, means of
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knowledge” (p. 58).4 The separation of this from the fallacious “sophistries” in the fifth
book is then a way to keep readers focused on the work’s main focus: “the acceptable and
sound method for philosophical discourse” (p. 58). However, the historical origins of the
sūtra’s organization will not be of concern. Rather, the focus is how a later philosopher,
Jayanta Bhat.t.a, understood the epistemological project of Nyāya as bound up with its
project of setting up reasonable rules of debate.
This brings us to Nicholson (2010, p. 78) argued that later commentators “find it
increasingly difficult to justify the relevance of the rhetorical techniques discussed in the
older parts of the NS to the epistemological cum soteriological project” (p. 78).5 Here, by
“rhetorical techniques”, he is referring to those used in purely agonistic forms of debate,
in which two interlocutors deploy tricks in order to be counted as winner, whether or
not their argument has genuine merit. His thesis was that the paradigmatic example of
a truth-seeking discussion is didactic debate, in which a performative “debate” is staged
between a teacher and a student (p. 78). On his view, there is an inherent instability to
discussion for Naiyāyikas. They allow for some points of defeat in discussion. Points of
defeat (nigrahasthanas) are situations in which an interlocutor is judged as failing to meet
some expectations in the content or expression of her reasoning. Forcing an opponent into
a point of defeat could be a strategy for winning a debate, as would using them without
being caught (if one’s use of such a point is identified by an opponent, that in itself is
a point of defeat, as is an opponent’s failure to so identify such a point). For instance,
stating something irrelevant (arthāntara, NS 5.2.7) is a point of defeat which would not be
allowed in discussion. In a disputation, in contrast, if such an irrelevant remark suited
one’s pragmatic goals of winning, it should be used, likewise for a range of other fallacies.
However, the points of defeat are characterized as flaws in the sūtra text. A debater ought
to avoid incurring them. So, how can a subset of flaws be acceptable in discussion if these
are suboptimal for coming to the truth?
As Nicholson (2010, p. 86) observed, “a debate without the possibility of defeat is
no longer a debate, but something else”, and so the “basic adversarial nature of debate”
is preserved by early Naiyāyikas by allowing some select points of defeat. However,
as noted earlier, on his view, Nyāya discussion is paradigmatically non-agonistic for
historical reasons. From a conceptual perspective, though, in considering debate, we
should distinguish two questions:
1. Is it possible to justify the use of flawed reasoning (e.g., points of defeat) in argumen-
tation which has truth as its aim?
2. Is it definitive of argumentation aiming at truth, that it be non-adversarial?
Answering negatively to (1) does not require doing so for (2). To put it explicitly,
it is possible to engage in agonistic debate in pursuit of the truth, provided that there
are rational norms in place to which both parties assent. This is a broadly Gricean point:
communication is a cooperative endeavor, even if two parties are at odds in other ways.
Todeschini (2010) made this point clearly in his discussion of the points of defeat, citing
Searle: “In order to be fighting at one level we have to be cooperating in having a fight at
another level” (p. 71).
If agonistic truth-seeking debate is conceptually possible, then the question becomes
whether any Naiyāyikas defended such an understanding of discussion. Jayanta Bhat.t.a’s
work provides an interesting case study for this question, as in his Nyāyamañjarı̄ (NM), he
seemed to align with the requirement that truth-seeking argumentation be didactic, not
adversarial, and yet in his play, the Āgamad. ambara (ĀD. ), he included a debate explicitly
presented as discussion (vāda), which is not between a teacher and a student. Rather,
it is an adversarial debate, before a watching audience, between members of opposing
traditions—a Buddhist and a Mı̄mām. sāka. As we will see, tensions still remain in the
relationship between adversariality and truth-seeking, though these are implicit in the play.
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2.2. Discussion’s Goals and Methods
Jayanta, in his opening remarks in the NM on the purpose of Nyāya, related supposi-
tional reasoning (tarka) and certainty (nirn. aya), two categories mentioned in NS 1.1.1., to
discussion (vāda).6 On his understanding, ascertainment of the truth of a position, or cer-
tainty (nirn. aya), is the goal of reasoning (nyāya). Certainty (nirn. aya) is defined at NS 1.1.41
as “the ascertainment of a fact (artha) by both standpoint and contrary standpoint, after
having deliberated”.7 An agent desires that her inquiry ceases with a settled position on a
subject. Thus while certainty has a subjective epistemic element—one might characterize it
as a person’s maximally strong confidence in the truth of a given claim—it is supposed
to be responsive to objective features in the world.8 In the context of discussion, certainty
should be an attitude a person has towards settled views, those which have been positively
supported by good reasons and whose contraries have been defeated in the same manner.
Yet it is not a kind of Cartesian indubitability, objectively immune to future doubt, since a
person can take up debates again, in new contexts, with new speakers.
Further, although inference is a tool for coming to know, it is not equivalent to, nor does
it guarantee, certainty. After all, many doubts arise about our reasoning in conversation
with others. It is only when doubts have been responded to, and the debate is over, that
an inquirer attains certainty.9 Again, while we must be cautious not to impute necessity
to debate for Nyāya—it is possible to ascertain the truth without engaging in debate—
controversy is likely to arise given the reality of opposing viewpoints in the world, and
debate practices grounded in epistemic norms, which distinguish between good and bad
reasoning, become crucial. I will illustrate this with Jayanta’s play, in which debate plays
a defensive role against threats to Vedic authority which might otherwise cause ordinary
people to have doubts. First, I show how the persuasive and rational elements of Nyāya
debate are brought together in Jayanta’s NM:
1. Truth-seeking discussion (debate) persuades interlocutors of the truth by resolving
uncertainty;
2. Discussion’s persuasive strategies are context-sensitive, thereby subject to pragmatic
analysis, but also rationally constrained, thereby subject to epistemic norms.
The first claim focuses on the importance of persuasion to the epistemic goals of
discussion. In contrast to argumentation that aims only at consensus or resolving a dispute,
Nyāya aims for participants to acquire knowledge. The second claim focuses on the
importance of pragmatic analysis of speech acts in context. While the tension between
what Greek and other traditions call “rhetoric” and “dialectic” appears also in Nyāya
thought as we have seen above, I argue that Naiyāyikas seek to incorporate rhetorical
methods within what is often called an “epistemic approach” to argumentation (e.g.,
Biro and Siegel 2006).10
Discussion and Other Debate Categories
What are these debate practices, then, and how are they related to the epistemological
project of Nyāya? Below is a brief summary of Jayanta’s account. A wealth of further
details are found in (Solomon 1976; Tripathi 2021).
Discussion (NS 1.2.1) is taking up a standpoint and a contrary standpoint, a taking
up whose supporting and criticizing is by epistemic instruments and suppositional
reasoning, which does not contradict settled claims, and which is obtained by the five
members of inference.11
Discussion (NM) is dispassionate discourse which results in certainty regarding a
matter.12
The kind of discourse which is paradigmatic for Nyāya philosophers is “discussion”,
also translated as “debate for the truth”. It is defined as having both a positive position or
standpoint (paks.a) as well as an opposing position (pratipaks.a), which are subject to evalu-
ation. It involves both inference, an epistemic instrument, and suppositional reasoning,
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which is not a way of knowing but an auxiliary useful for critical investigation into the
entailments of competing claims. Jayanta added that discussion is a kind of “dispassionate”
(vı̄tarāga) discourse. This term is loaded with soteriological connotations, though it might
be glossed as “sober-minded” and “impartial”, insofar as it characterizes an agent whose
concern is the truth and not personal victory over an opponent. Finally, Jayanta emphasized
the result of certainty—that is, ascertaining in a definitive way, against the backdrop of
doubt, what one ought to believe on a matter.
While dependence on discussion, implied by the reference to “standpoint and contrary
standpoint” is paradigmatic for acquiring certainty, it is not a necessary condition, since
from Vātsyāyana onward, epistemic instruments such as perception are also declared to be
ways of gaining certainty. However, when some matter is doubtful and two positions are
at issue, then the goal of discussion is to acquire certainty, and once certainty is acquired
by one of the participants, the discussion ends—Uddyotakara made this explicit in his
commentary.13 Jayanta even added that, sometimes, two people who enter a discussion
without themselves having doubts will come to doubt midway through the conversation,
since the reasoning of their opponent may be strong.14
In order to acquire certainty about some matter by discussion, certain procedures
must be followed, in particular the use of rational means to support one’s own position
and to criticize the opponent’s position. Paradigmatically, this occurs through the “great
sentence” (mahāvākya) that presents an inference, an expression which is composed of
five components (defined at NS 1.1.33–39).15 Further, these five components are together
necessary and sufficient for coming to know, as evidenced by the existence of two points
of defeat known as “insufficiency” (nyūna) and “excess” (adhika). Lacking one of the
parts constitutes insufficiency and would force defeat, and likewise for adding additional
components, such as extra supporting examples or reasons.16 Epistemically speaking, a
person who understands an inference which is well-formed and consists in genuine reasons
will come to know the inferential conclusion, or the thing to be proven (sādhya). Further
constraining the inference is that it ought not have a “pseudo” or “bogus” reason, known
as a hetvābhāsa. The reason given ought to have a genuinely supporting relationship with
the thesis being set forward.17
However, within the broadly externalist epistemic framework of Nyāya philosophy,
that one comes to know p does not entail that they also know that they know p, so that the
mere presence of a genuine inference in a debate may not end the discussion. It proceeds
until the participants in the debate are no longer in doubt about whose position is correct.
Therefore discussion aims for not just first-order knowing (knowing that p) but higher-order
knowing, knowing that one knows p.
While not an epistemic instrument itself, suppositional reasoning (tarka) is an auxiliary;
it is especially useful for criticizing an opponent’s position by considering whether the
entailments that follow are in conflict with accepted facts. Jayanta Bhat.t.a explained suppo-
sitional reasoning’s purpose as being to bring about clarity of mind.18 As Kang (2010, p. 16)
pointed out, Jayanta characterized suppositional reasoning as a means of “clarification
of the object” (vis.ayapariśodhana) insofar as it rules out one of two options. Essentially,
suppositional reasoning excludes an option on the basis of reasoning, but not by further
understanding of the facts of the matter themselves, which is the role of epistemic instru-
ments. This process of exclusion by suppositional reasoning must have an end, as Jayanta
ironically notes, in a section focusing on why this term is treated separately in NS 1.1.1.
When two positions are considered equal—making determination of the topic
doubtful—by making one of two positions weak, suppositional reasoning favors
abandoning the position opposite from the one which is free from problems,
the content belonging to the other position is understood to be an epistemic
instrument (pramān. a). Therefore suppositional reasoning is treated separately.
And suppositional reasoning is employed in discussion to make clarity of mind
appear. Thus suppositional reasoning does not stop without certainty of the
authority of one of the two positions, since certainty’s function is causing the
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completion of reasoning. On the other hand, without a limit, its result remaining
unaccomplished, what person would undertake reasoning?19
Another important restriction on discussion is that it does not contradict settled claims
(siddhāntāviruddha). Precisely what this amounts to is a matter of controversy among early
commentators. Vātsyāyana argued that its mention excluded from a discussion a kind
of fallacy known as “contradiction” (viruddha) introduced at NS 1.2.6 (See G. Jha 1984,
vol. 1, p. 482). This kind of error, which is specifically a failure of the reason component
of the five-member inference, occurs when someone puts forward a thesis that some a is
an S and then, in their reason, explicitly claims that a is not an S or (more likely) claims
something that entails such a commitment. Essentially, he takes the sūtra’s statement to
preclude putting forward reasons which have such a flaw. In contrast, Uddyotakara argues
that the restriction is associated with a point of defeat known as “in opposition to what is
settled” (apasiddhānta). This point of defeat, found at NS 5.2.23, is broader than the fallacy
of contradiction, as it is defined as an interlocutor’s engaging in debate without qualifying
their comments so as to avoid contradiction with something which has been established
(See G. Jha 1984, vol. 4, p. 1769). Uddyotakara distinguished this from contradiction by
noting that in this case “one is defeated because they give up an idea that has been settled,
with the exception of the idea expressed by the thesis”.20
Jayanta noted this controversy and sided with Vātsyāyana, stating that Uddyotakara’s
interpretation was inapt (anupapanna).21 He argued that not all the points of defeat should
be used to defeat another person in discussion. For instance, an opponent being momen-
tarily embarrassed or without an idea (apratibhā) is not a reason to declare victory over
them. Instead, only those particular points of defeat which are relevant to the argument
itself should be employed. Further, in the context of discussion, accidental errors do not
bring about the end of the conversation. Jayanta noted that “pointing them out is neces-
sary, because when they are not pointed out, the subject matter would not be completely
justified”.22 Thus the relevant question is not whether an interlocutor in a discussion ought
to strive for consistency—they should—but whether this results in an end to the debate.
Jayanta seemed to think that only when a person had abandoned their thesis, which is
inconsistency in the narrow sense, that debate should end, but not when one failed in mere
performative matters.23 Otherwise, pointing out inconsistencies which arise in the course
of discussion is useful for truth-seeking, but need not end the conversational exchange. The
goal is not to defeat an opponent due to irrelevant flaws, but to come to know the truth.
Finally, in discussion, along with the general avoidance of forcing points of defeat,
participants are to avoid chala and jāti. Chala is sometimes translated as “equivocation”
(Dasti and Phillips 2017) or “casuistry” (G. Jha 1984), and jāti as “misleading objections”
(Dasti and Phillips 2017) or “futile rejoinders” (G. Jha 1984). In his opening remarks,
echoing its definition at NS 1.2.10, Jayanta defined chala as “opposition to an expression by
an alternative meaning”.24 Whether intentional or unintentional, a chala is an argumentative
flaw insofar as one person misascribes a meaning to another person’s speech, and then
proceeds to raise an objection to that other meaning. A jāti, in contrast, is “an objection
which has some similarity with or difference from the reason”.25 While the original NS at
1.2.18 (and indeed, Jayanta’s initial gloss) does not state that the similarity or difference is
faulty, this is the understanding of jāti in subsequent tradition.26 The objection depends on
some irrelevant comparison for its force. Both of these—chala and jāti—are excluded from
discussion as a matter of definition.
3. Frans van Eemeren’s Pragma-Dialectic Argumentation Theory
Turning from 9th century India to the Netherlands in the twentieth century, another
theory of argumentation known as “pragma-dialectics” begins with the work of Rob
Grootendorst and Frans van Eemeren.27 It is within the purview of argumentation theory,
an interdisciplinary effort to analyze argumentative discourse in both its normative and
descriptive aspects. Participants in this effort include philosophers, logicians, commu-
Religions 2021, 12, 875 8 of 25
nication theorists, linguists, lawyers, and psychologists. Pragma-dialectics understands
argumentation as, paradigmatically, a “critical discussion”, or a discussion which aims
to resolve of a difference of opinions. Grootendorst and van Eemeren’s work analyzed
the strategic maneuvers that participants can use in order to persuade their interlocutors
within reasonable restrictions. Strategies are context-dependent and will vary depending
on conversational purposes, audience, and the interlocutors themselves.
Put succinctly, their definition of argumentation was:
Argumentation is a communicative and interactional act complex aimed at re-
solving a difference of opinion with the addressee by putting forward a constella-
tion of propositions for which the arguer can be held accountable in order to make
the standpoint at issue acceptable to a rational judge who judges reasonably.
(van Eemeren 2018, p. 21)
As a theory, pragma-dialectics aims to analyze actual arguments between interlocutors,
and takes as its starting point differences of opinion—whether occurrent conflicts or those
which are anticipated (p. 21). In contrast to approaches which abstract from contexts of
utterance, pragma-dialectics focuses on understanding the argumentative functions of
language (broadly construed to include linguistic, visual, and other systems of signs). This
descriptive component of the approach is coupled with a normative aspect, an analysis
of the rules for the speech acts made in a particular argumentative context, which they
call “reasonableness conditions” (p. 29). These rules constrain the speech acts to those
which resolve the difference of opinion on the merits. Importantly, there are two levels of
constraints:
Problem-validity. A property of a set of rules which are jointly necessary and
sufficient for excluding fallacious argumentative speech acts.
Conventional validity. A property of a set of rules which are intersubjectively
acceptable to the participants in a critical discussion.28
Already, some overlap is observable between Nyāya debate theory and pragma-
dialectics. Rather than concern with an abstracted set of propositions, both are interested in
complex speech acts which unfold over time between two parties. Naiyāyikas characterize
inference as a “large sentence” (mahāvākya), suggesting a similar conception of argumen-
tation. Further, they are concerned with having all and only the necessary components
of this speech act, evidenced in the flaws of insufficiency and excess. At the same time,
they recognize that argumentation is more than competing inferences. The points of defeat,
chala, and jāti, attest to the existence of other speech acts in the context of the debate, which
are explicitly illustrated in Jayanta’s play. Take the point of defeat ananubhās.ana, inability
to reiterate an opponent’s statement. It presupposes that reiteration is part of the debate
process (Todeschini 2010, p. 63). While in Nyāya discussion, such a failure would not
close the debate, since points of defeat are generally excluded. This does not mean that
reiteration was not part of the expected discourse. There are also suggestions that speech
acts other than argumentative assertions are expected in Nyāya discussion. Another point
of defeat is when an opponent fails to point out what is objectionable, or does not point
out that their interlocutor has committed a fallacy (p. 65). This attests to the expectation of
“commissives”, or a speech act that commits a speaker to an action (p. 40).
Fallacies (in Nyāya terms, points of defeat, pseudo-reasons, chala, and jāti) are excluded
by pragma-dialectics because they violate a set of agreed-upon rules which are problem-
valid and conventionally-valid. Pragma-dialecticists generate a set of rules which they
find appropriate for resolving a difference of opinion “on the merits”, or in a reasonable
manner. The aim in such a discussion—the above-named “critical discussion”—is for both
parties to agree on the “acceptability of the standpoint at issue by finding out whether the
one party’s standpoint is tenable against the other party’s doubts and criticisms in light
of the mutually accepted starting points” (p. 35). Therefore they formulated ten rules for
reasonable resolution of a discussion:29
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1. Freedom rule: discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints
or from calling standpoints into question;
2. Obligation to defend rule: discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to
defend this standpoint when requested to do so;
3. Standpoint rule: attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not
actually been put forward by the other party;
4. Relevance rule: standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argu-
mentation that is not relevant to the standpoint;
5. Unexpressed premise rule: discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises
to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises;
6. Starting point rule: discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted
starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.
7. Validity rule: reasoning that is in an argumentation explicitly and fully expressed
may not be invalid in a logical sense;
8. Argument scheme rule: standpoints defended by argumentation that is not explicitly
and fully expressed may not be regarded as conclusively defended by such argumen-
tation unless the defense takes place by means of appropriate argument schemes that
are applied correctly;
9. Concluding rule: inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining
these standpoints and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining
expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints;
10. Language use rule: discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently
clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other
party’s formulations.
Todeschini (2010) has already done significant work showing how Nyāya points of
defeat can be intelligible as violations of Gricean maxims, in particular the first: “Make
your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”
(p. 68). But in the pragma-dialectic approach, we find a narrower analysis of the ways in
which, as Todeschini said, the “debater fails to contribute as required”. For instance, the
language use rule (10) speaks to the manner of one’s contribution, in particular Grice’s
maxim: “Avoid obscurity of expression” (Todeschini 2010, p. 68). We may note, however,
some ways that Nyāya discussion goes beyond pragma-dialectics: chala is a fault whether
one deliberately or accidentally misinterprets what has been said when attempting an
objection, in contrast to the deliberate misinterpretation in rule 10. Since misinterpretation,
whatever its source (ignorance or strategy), obstructs a resolution on the merits, the Nyāya
version of (10) would strengthen the sufficiency of the set of rules in excluding fallacies.
In the same spirit, the starting point rule (6) corresponds to the Naiyāyika emphasis on
consistency with a debater’s settled claims or siddhānta, which are typically conceived of as
tradition- or school-wide. The Nyāya version is also stronger: a debater may not contradict
their settled claims. As I argued earlier, in Jayanta’s discussion of “non-contradiction with
what is settled”, these starting points need not play a particular role within the inference
(the thesis), nor should an inconsistency put an end to the discussion. However, once
such a rule-violation has been discovered, it ought to be addressed, again, to keep the
argumentative discourse aimed at the merits of the standpoint under investigation. This
paper will not attempt to align pragma-dialectic rules with every Nyāya fallacy (broadly
conceived, so including pseudo-reasons, points of defeat, chala, and jāti). This can be left
to future research.30 For now, the main contours of theoretical overlap between the two
methods are sufficiently clear: both have normative and descriptive elements, and both are
concerned with argumentation as the unfolding of a complex communicative act in time.
Certainly Nyāya debate is narrower than the argumentative discourses which are the focus
of pragma-dialectics (as the latter does not only focus on formal debates). This difference
notwithstanding, the two approaches could be mutually supportive. Before concluding
with a case study from Jayanta’s play, I will identify two further aspects of pragma-dialectic
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theory that are important for this analysis: its identification of argumentative stages and its
distinction between truth and acceptability.
Pragma-dialectic argumentation which is “on the merits”—that is, following the ideal
model and set of rules described above—is analyzed in terms of stages. These may not
be entirely sequential. Discourse analysis employing pragma-dialectic approaches re-
constructs the elements of a discourse which correspond to these stages: confrontation,
opening, argumentation, and concluding (discussed in van Eemeren 2018, pp. 36–38). See
Table 2 for a summary. For instance, at the confrontation stage, there is some difference
of opinion which becomes apparent. This may include two people taking up opposing
positions on a single proposition (p, not p), which is the standard catalyst for Nyāya dis-
cussion. However, pragma-dialectics distinguishes further between single and multiple
differences of opinion: “single” includes disagreement about one proposition, whereas
“multiple” ranges over more. It also distinguishes between mixed and non-mixed differ-
ences, where a “mixed” difference of opinion is opposition, or two standpoints (p, not p),
and a “non-mixed” includes only one standpoint (p, is it true p?). The Nyāya category of
“wrangling” (vitan. d. ā) would be a kind of non-mixed difference of opinion, since it includes
a proponent of a standpoint and an interlocutor who only challenges that standpoint but
does not commit to its opposite. Unlike in pragma-dialectics, this is a deviant form of
debate, one which not only lacks a counter-standpoint, but which is understood to allow
non-rational means of resolution.
Table 2. Stages of argumentation in pragma-dialectics.
Stage Description
Confrontation The existence of a difference of opinion, doubt, or contradiction regardingstandpoint(s).
Opening The assignment of participant roles (protagonist arguing for p, antagonistarguing not p).
Argumentation The deployment of moves with the goal of convincing, defending.
Concluding The protagonist and antagonist determine resolution to difference ofopinion.
The subsequent stages include (2) opening, taking particular roles vis-à-vis the stand-
point(s), (3) argumentation, engaging in argumentative moves, and (4) conclusion, com-
ing to an agreement about the tenability of the standpoints under discussion. The ex-
istence of stages in pragma-dialectical analysis emphasizes not only the temporality of
argumentation as a communicative act—in contrast to an abstracted set of propositions—
but also the necessity of certain components for resolving an argument on the merits
(van Eemeren 2018, p. 36).
For instance, the confrontation is the required trigger for critical discussion, just as the
existence of opposition (pratyanı̄ka) is necessary for triggering Nyāya discussion.31 However,
as I have shown, opposition is narrower than confrontation, as it requires two standpoints
(p, not p). Naiyāyikas argue that even in so-called “destructive” debate or wrangling
(vitan. d. ā), where no counter-position is explicitly stated, one is implied by the questioning
of p. In Jayanta’s words, “What belongs to the destructive debater, who is the speaker of
the later standpoint, as it is dependent on putting forward an earlier standpoint, by the
maxim of ‘one hand and the other hand’, is said to be a counter-standpoint”, concluding
that the counter-standpoint is implied.32 As with pragma-dialectic analyses, Naiyāyikas
are interested not only in what is explicitly stated, but what is hinted or suggested (Jayanta
used the verb aks. ip, meaning “imply”) in their analysis of what is actually occurring in a
debate context.33 Unlike pragma-dialectics, though, the combination of a merely implied
position not-p and explicit criticism of p is associated with irrational means for its resolution,
a point that Solomon (1976, p. 115) lamented, and Nicholson (2010, p. 92) explained as
a hangover from earlier textual material being incorporated into the tradition.34 This is
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because wrangling is defined as a subtype of disputation, which is characterized by its
methodology: win at whatever cost, even if this involves fallacies. However, as Nicholson
pointed out, at least one early Nyāya philosopher (Sānātani, mentioned in Udayana’s
commentary on the NS) accepted the possibility of a truth-seeking discussion where the
contrary position is implicit (p. 92). Jayanta himself said little about wrangling, merely
clarifying that there is an implicit position, but that there is no genuine support (sādhana)
for it.35 He accepted that it was a subtype of disputation, which aimed at victory not
truth—and thus its participants would employ whatever rhetorical means were at their
disposal, regardless of their rationality.36
The other three stages are also necessary. The opening state in which interlocutors
assign roles and identify starting points ensures the possibility of resolution, since, with-
out some shared common ground, engaging in critical discussion would be pointless
(van Eemeren 2018, p. 37). Argumentation is the persuasive portion of the discourse, in
which argumentative speech acts are exchanged. These are necessary in order for rational
persuasion on the merits to occur, not mere agreement by some other means, such as
drawing straws. Finally, without a concluding stage, the difference of opinion remains un-
resolved.
As noted above, a pragma-dialectic approach distinguishes between problem-valid
and conventionally-valid rules, arguing that “in argumentative discourse more often than
not it is not the truth of standpoints . . . that is at issue, but their acceptability . . . not
a final justification . . . ” (p. 29). On this understanding, the conventionally-valid rules
contribute to the intersubjective agreement on whether the difference of opinion has been
satisfactorily resolved, and the problem-valid rules are a way to ensure that the agreement
has some rational basis—that it occurs in virtue of “appealing to [the listener’s or reader’s]
reasonableness” (p. 30). However, by explicitly eschewing “final justification”, pragma-
dialectics leaves itself open to the charge that the approach is unmoored from rationality in
a robust sense. This approach is in striking contrast to Nyāya discussion which aims at
certainty (nirn. aya) and truth (tattva).
In addition to criticizing van Eemeren’s (and Grootendorst’s) reading of Popper which
led them to reject “final justification”, Siegel and Biro (2008) argued that their account of
“reasonableness” was inadequate. Their imagined counterexample is a group of white
racists coming to agreement, through a critical discussion, that one of them should not vote
for a black candidate. The critical discussion entirely accords with their intersubjectively-
agreed-upon pragma-dialectical rules. Still, while the conclusion comes about through
conventionally-valid (agreed-upon) rules and problem-valid (non-fallacious) rules, Siegel
and Biro concluded that the resultant belief: “I should not vote for a black candidate”
was not in fact justified by the racist beliefs that the interlocutors hold (p. 194). They
diagnosed van Eemeren’s hesitancy with “final justification” as, at least in part, a worry
that no resolution could ever be entirely immune to further investigation, and thus that any
stopping point is arbitrary. What is needed, they argued, is the possibility of a non-arbitrary
stopping point in a critical discussion which provides positive justification for a standpoint
(p. 200).
Here is where Nyāya discussion, with its conception of truth-seeking debate, provides
a view of justification which is consistent with fallibilism: a person could erroneously
believe they have settled a disagreement on the merits when they have not drawn a
rational conclusion. At the same time, Naiyāyikas are adamant that truth is the long game
for discussion. As Jayanta put it, considering the usefulness of suppositional reasoning
(note 9 below), “On the other hand, without a limit, its result remaining unaccomplished,
what person would undertake reasoning?” The result is not mere agreement, but rather the
ascertainment of truth. Thus, for Nyāya philosophers, truth-seeking discussion persuades
interlocutors of the truth, by resolving uncertainty. The uncertainty is about a fact of the
matter, and the goal is to acquire new beliefs (or defend previously-held ones) which are
grounded in reasons and which are true.
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This goal is especially important in the context of differences of opinion over soterio-
logical matters, which is the focus of Jayanta’s play, the Āgamad. ambara, or Much Ado About
Religion.
4. Disagreements about Religion, Settled on the Merits?
In addition to his works of Nyāya philosophy, Jayanta Bhat.t.a wrote a four-act play
which is set in Kashmir during the reign of a historical ruler, King Śaṅkaravarman, who
lived 883–902 CE, and to whom he was an adviser.37 Jayanta’s play mostly centers on
a young Mı̄mām. saka, Saṅkars.an. a, who roams around Kashmir, engaging opponents in
debate: a Buddhist (Act I), a Jain (Act II), and a Cārvāka (Act III).
The main issue in the play is how a kingdom with a plurality of different religious
groups ought to draw boundaries between what is acceptable and not. While the play
begins with a Mı̄mām. saka, it is a Naiyāyika, Dhairyarāśi, who has the final say against
the backdrop of growing controversy about the tantric “black-blankets” (nı̄lāmbaras) and
whether the Bhāgavatā scriptures should be considered authoritative. He argues in a
lengthy monologue, quoting Jayanta, that “The many means taught by various scriptural
approaches converge in the single summum bonum (śreyasa) as the currents of the Ganges
meet in the ocean” (Dezső 2005, p. 229). Further, he argues that as long as a scripture does
not go beyond certain agreed-upon moral standards—as in the case of the black-blankets—
even Buddhist, Jain, or Śaivite Bhagavatās are traceable to the Vedas in some sense.38
The play’s heavily philosophical content and insistence on dealing with current events
may mean its artistic value is limited to a very narrow audience. A.K. Warder (Warder 1988,
p. 310) said, it is “not one of the most entertaining pieces produced by the Indian theatre”,
and the “last act is little but a long lecture”. Yet, setting aside questions of its aesthetic merit,
it is, as he said, a “historical document”, and one which “shows the practice of debating”
(pp. 310, 311). While the debates are surely stylized, their content parallels known texts, so
that the dialogues in the play can be treated as at least somewhat representative of the kind
of argumentative discourse that might have been found in 9th and 10th century Kashmir.
In his introduction to the play, Csaba Dezső has already shown how it illustrates
Jayanta’s understanding of Nyāya as a defender of Vedic orthodoxy, focusing on the
final monologue. The next part of the paper will show how Jayanta’s play illustrates his
understanding of the relationship between argumentative strategies and truth-seeking
in debate. Further, I apply pragma-dialectic analysis to the play, showing how well the
debates fit the four-stage framework of that approach, and how we can appreciate the
various speech acts deployed in debate through this analysis.
4.1. Noisy Blather in Debate
First, a remark about the title of the play: Āgamad. ambara. The term d. ambara can mean
“noise, bombast, confused mass” (Macdonell 2001, p. 104), and it is what Dezső translated
as “much ado” in his title Much Ado About Religion, playing on Shakespeare’s Much Ado
About Nothing. Jayanta used this term in the play and his NM in a way that suggests the
“much ado” in the play may be restricted to portions of the debates, and not the entire
play’s “ado” or “controversy” over religious texts (āgama). In his comments on NS 1.2.1, he
distinguished the discussion’s conclusion from the conclusions of other kinds of debate,
such as disputation (jalpa), saying:
. . . discussion indeed results in settling one of the standpoints, although it does
not terminate in flawed criticisms which are composed of blather (d. ambaraviracita)
out of contempt for another person, like disputation. Thus in this way, lacking the
use of intentional fallacies, it is said to be discourse without self-centeredness.39
Earlier, in his opening remarks, he used the same term, strengthened by the prefix ā-
to mean “a lot of” or “intense” blather. Here again, it refers to language used in a debate,
specifically the wrangling and disputation sorts of debate. In his initial gloss of these two
terms from NS 1.1.1, he says:
Religions 2021, 12, 875 13 of 25
But with regard to wrangling and disputation: on some occasions, these are
able to be employed by someone who is dispassionate, too, in order to protect
the knowledge of the truth situated in the hearts of those honest people who
are greatly afraid of the boisterous blather (ād. ambara) of fraudulent criticism
constructed by wicked reasoners, by greatly consoling them.40
Thus “blather” (d. ambara) characterizes wrangling and disputation, since it is a great
deal of empty noise with no logical impact. Yet Jayanta allowed that wrangling and
disputation, in which fallacious moves as well as forcing points of defeat could be used in
order to acquire victory, was, in some special circumstances, acceptable for people whose
aims were truth-seeking and who were morally upright. This raises the question as to
whether the debates in Much Ado are discussion or not, since we know in advance that our
protagonist is at least a defender of the Vedas (even if he is, by Jayanta’s lights, a confused
Mı̄mām. saka).
In the play itself, this question is implicitly raised by the charge to the protagonist
Saṅkars.an. a as he is about to debate his first opponent, the Buddhist monk Dharmottara.
Several onlookers agree to play the role of an adjudicating audience only if the participants
agree to several conditions, one of which is to avoid kathād. ambara, or, as Dezső translated
it, “a noisy mass of bad disputation”.41 That they are to avoid disputation in the technical
sense (as jalpa) is implicit in the attachment of kathā (discourse or debate) to d. ambara
(“blather” or “noise”), since as we have seen, the kinds of debate which are characterized
by noisy blather are disputation and wrangling. However, it might be asked whether the
protagonist succeeds, or if this is one of those special occasions where he must stoop below
the paradigmatic level of discussion in order to defend the Vedas. With this allusion to
sub-par forms of debate in mind, I turn now to Act One.
4.2. Act One: Argumentation Stages of the Buddhists Defeated
The debate between Dharmottara and Saṅkars.an. a in Act One of Jayanta’s play unfolds
in the sequence identified in pragma-dialectic analysis. Unlike discourse in which the
stages are not sequential and must be reconstructed, here, the progression is clear.42
This act begins with Saṅkars.an. a eavesdropping on the Buddhists at their monastery,
finding fault with their drinking alcohol and eating meat, despite their supposedly ascetic
vows. He approaches a monk named Dharmottara—which is the name of a follower
of Dharmakı̄rti, a famous Buddhist predating Jayanta—and introduces himself and his
companion to the Buddhist monk, who is teaching a young disciple. The two trade insults,
and when the Buddhist disciple restates what he has been taught (Table 3, confrontation),
Saṅkars.an. a insults the idea that one could attain salvation (śreya) by rejecting the idea of
the self. In response, Dharmottara accuses Saṅkars.an. a of having a morally and cognitively
“muddied” mind, since he kills animals to achieve his salvation (p. 63). Saṅkars.an. a notices
that some Vedic-professing people have come to watch his dispute, and engages them in a
role as “arbiters” (prāśnikas).
Table 3. Confrontation in Act One.
Stage Example Dialogue
Confrontation
Buddhist Disciple: “Why, the master has taught me the Four
Noble Truths: Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the
Cessation of Suffering, and the Way”.
Saṅkars.an. a: “That’s the teaching of the supremely
compassionate one? And this is not gibberish (pralāpa)43
where the realization of having no Self is celebrated as the
path leading to salvation?” (p. 63)
The arbiters agree to observe the debate, but only on certain conditions:
If your talk is correct, moderate, and springs from the settled view (siddhānta);
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if you avoid blathering discourse (kathād. ambara) full of misinterpretations (chala),
futile rejoinders (jāti), and points of defeat,
if there is no envy at all in your heart, no roughness in your words, no frowning
on your face;
if this is a discussion (vāda) among virtuous persons, then we are always ready to
serve as assessors (p. 65, adapted).
Essentially, the arbiters restrict the debaters to engage in discussion, and not stoop to
the other forms of debate, wrangling and disputation. Unless the two interlocutors agree
on these terms, they will not agree as to what behavior is out of bounds.44 In addition
to the requirements to keep to already-mentioned norms about speech and rationality,
the arbiters introduce requirements about attitude and decorum. The debaters should
lack envy (ı̄rs.yā), words that are abusive (parus.a), and faces that have furrowed brows
(bhrūvibheda) (Dezső 2005, p. 64). While the latter two are performative, the first is about
the reason a person engages in debate. Envy is one of the moral flaws that, according to
the NS, motivates acting, and is a kind of aversion (dves.a). Envy motivates obstructive
behavior, which may be why it is singled out in this context—an envious debater may try
to keep the other from coming to know the truth, even though ostensibly, the truth is what
both participants desire.45 This restriction goes well beyond anything pragma-dialectic
approaches require, though, as some have argued, requirements about the character of
interlocutors are consistent with the model.46
Once the two agree to the requirements, the arbiters ask who has stated the first
standpoint (Table 4). This is a neutral way to characterize the positions involved in a debate:
one begins and the other responds. However, Saṅkars.an. a responds by characterizing the
Buddhist’s view as the prima-facie view (purvapaks.a), a term reserved for views which
initially seem correct but will later be shown faulty. He restates what the Buddhist says—
a requirement in Nyāya debate known as restatement (anubhās.ana)—and Dharmottara
grudgingly accepts it as accurate.47 This requirement does not neatly fall into the speech
act categories within pragma-dialectics, based on Searle’s taxonomy: assertives, directives,
commissives, declarations, and expressives. It is a kind of meta-discourse, or a quotation
of previous speech, which may be direct quotation or restating in other words (paraphrase,
indirect quotation), or some combination (mixed).48
Table 4. Opening in Act One.
Stage Example Dialogue
Opening
Saṅkars.an. a: “Here am I, and here is the monk, you are prudent arbiters:
what an incomparable opportunity to consider the strong and weak points
of the argument!” (p. 65)
[ . . . ]
Arbiters: “So which one of you has put forward his thesis first
(prathamapaks.avādı̄)?”
Saṅkars.an. a: “The monk has indeed set forth the prima-facie view
(purvapaks.a-) while teaching the disciple”. (p. 65)
The argumentation stage of the act is complex and would require an independent
treatment to do it justice, as it alludes to a range of Buddhist philosophical ideas.49 Below I
analyze one portion, shown in Table 5. One major claim is presented as a counterfactual—
the relationship between the momentariness of everything and the Buddhist path to nirvān. a.
The momentariness of everything is supposed to be a reason, in the five-fold structure of
inference, for the existence of the Buddhist path. In other words, there is an invariable
relationship between momentariness and the path: if everything is momentary, then
the Buddhist path is established, and if the Buddhist path is established, everything is
momentary. Momentariness itself is then argued for, as well as the claim that consciousness
alone, and no external objects, exist.
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Table 5. Argumentation in Act One.
Stage Example Dialogue
Argumentation
Saṅkars.an. a: Even if the aforementioned path to liberation were to exist
when the existence of momentariness is established, still, things, being
examined carefully, do not experience momentariness.
Dharmottara: Why?
Saṅkars.an. a: Just because it lacks a reason.
Dharmottara: But hasn’t the reason been stated? “Because it exists”.
Saṅkars.an. a: The concomitance with the probandum, i.e., “momentariness”,
of the proof of “existence”, which you Buddhists teach cannot be
ascertained along a straight path, as can be in the case of smoke and fire,
since no example appears to support it, and therefore it is useless.
Dharmottara: If it’s this way, what follows? Even understanding the
pervasion relationship by exclusion is also understanding the pervasion
relationship. Further, being excluded from permanent things because it
lacks sequential or simultaneous efficacy, what exists “places its foot” in
momentary entities, because another place is impossible.
The opening part of the argument, which focuses on the relationship between momen-
tariness and the Buddhist path, illustrates how debate proceeds by a range of speech acts
beyond assertives. Questions and indirect argumentation are strategic responses. At each
point in the debate, the interlocutors have a range of choices, and they respond in ways
that are constrained by the agreed-upon rules and their stated goal of evaluating the truth
of the claims (not primarily rhetorical victory). Their goal is persuasive and also rational.
Simultaneously, because the debate is agonistic, the moves they make are ones which they
judge will resolve the debate favorably for them.
In the first set of exchanges, Saṅkars.an. a criticizes Dharmottara’s argumentation by
showing that the reasoning has fallacies. His reply begins with an approach explicitly
described at NS 1.1.31, in which one accepts another person’s (or tradition’s) views as
settled provisionally, for the purpose of investigating them:
When, for the sake of careful examination of the details of a view, there is the
suppositional acceptance of something that has not yet been examined closely,
this is a position accepted on the basis of supposition.
(Dasti and Phillips 2017, p. 51)
Following this provisional acceptance, one then goes on to “make known the excel-
lence of one’s own thesis and to condemn the thesis of another” (p. 52).
This is precisely what Saṅkars.an. a does. One aspect of the Buddhist standpoint, as he
has characterized it, is that “ . . . the path to attain [the cessation of suffering] is obtained
from establishing the momentariness [of everything]”.50 Saṅkars.an. a argues counterfactu-
ally, allowing that this path could exist on the basis of establishing momentariness, but
then denying that momentariness exists.
Even if the aforementioned path to liberation were to exist when the existence
of momentariness is established, still, things, being examined carefully, do not
experience momentariness.51
Since the relationship between momentariness and the truth of the Buddhist path is
supposed to be invariable—in other terms, necessary and sufficient—demonstrating that
momentariness is false undermines the truth of the Buddhist path.
Dharmottara’s response is to elicit more argumentation, simply asking, “why?” (kutah. ).
It is a directive—a speech act that “involve(s) an attempt to make the addressee do what
is expressed in the propositions they relate to” (p. 39). At this stage in the debate, he has
little room to maneuver, since Saṅkars.an. a has chosen to begin by temporarily accepting
his starting point, and then merely denying one claim, without any supporting reason for
that denial.
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The subsequent reply and counter-reply exchange is curt:
Saṅkars.an. a: Just because it lacks a reason.
Dharmottara: But hasn’t the reason been stated? “Because it exists”.52
Here, in response to Saṅkars.an. a’s assertive, which charges Dharmottara’s inference
with lacking a reason, the Buddhist replies with a discourse particle that can be read
rhetorically: nanu. He could have responded with a straightforward assertion that denies
the charge, like, “No. The reason has already been stated” (na. purvokto hetuh. ). The choice
of a rhetorical question could be a strategic choice, as such questions state things so that
an affirmative reply is tacitly expected against what has already occurred in the debate.53
We notice that there are choices available to debaters beyond mere assertion which are
consistent with Nyāya rational requirements. Assertions or rhetorical questions both carry
the same content, though with different illocutionary force.
In reply, Saṅkars.an. a first implicitly charges Dharmottara with a fallacy in the use of
momentariness as a reason, which is that it lacks any supporting example (dr. s. t. ānta).54 This
fallacy, known as deviation (savyabicāra), is particularly a problem for universal claims,
since it is a failure to present a supporting example which is outside the scope of the target
under investigation. Ordinarily, when arguing for a thesis that asserts some property
exists in a target location—paradigmatically, fieriness characterizes a distant mountain—an
agent puts forward a reason (“The mountain is smoky”) and also a supporting positive
example (“campfires are place where smoke and fire are found together”) that supports
the invariable connection between smoke and fire (“where there is smoke, there is fire”). If
one put forward the mountain itself as support for this rule, it would be question-begging.
However, when the target is everything that exists, then no independent positive example
can be given.55
In speech act terms, however, Saṅkars.an. a does not charge Dharmottara with a fallacy
openly, through an assertive which lays claim to a particular fallacy by name. Rather, he
simply states that the connection between the thesis and reason cannot be understood
“along a straight path” (na śakyam r. junā mārgena) because it lacks an example.56 Keeping in
mind the strategic purposes of his replies, his choice of language may be to subtly poke
at the Buddhist “path” (mārga) as not being “straight” in the sense of honest or moral,
another common connotation of r. ju. He is not only concerned with refuting Dharmottara’s
arguments, but with swaying the arbiters, and by slyly suggesting that Buddhists are
immoral, he appeals to their shared Vedic commitments. Since the act is bookended—as I
will show—with criticisms about the honesty of the Buddhist religious path, this reading
is in line with Saṅkars.an. a’s stated concerns, which are not just that the Buddhists are
mistaken, but that they are charlatans.
Dharmottara’s response is to ask, “If it’s this way, what follows?” (yady evam. tatah. kim).
While not an assertive speech act, the question implies one, a rejection of the purported
fallacy. He is essentially asserting that the structure of his reasoning is acceptable, even
while agreeing with Saṅkars.an. a’s characterization of it. This is clear in his following
sentence, which clarifies why the structure should be allowed: “Even understanding
the pervasion relationship by exclusion (vyatireka) is also understanding the pervasion
relationship”.57 Both concomitance (anvaya) and exclusion (vyatireka) in examples are
legitimate means of understanding the pervasion relationship. In addition to stating
that the campfire is an instance where smoke and fire are found (a positive example
of concomitance), one could put forward a negative example of exclusion, of a lake,
where neither are found. After defending his original formulation, Dharmottara gives an
additional argument to support his claim of momentariness.
Further, being excluded from permanent things because it lacks sequential or
simultaneous efficacy, what exists “places its foot” in momentary entities, because
another place is impossible.58
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Without getting too deep into the technical details of this dispute, the crucial move
Dharmottara makes is to bolster his claim that the negative formulation is necessary because
there are absolutely no instances of something that exists being non-momentary. The idea,
roughly, is that all effects must either occur after their cause (sequentially) or at the same
time. However, something which exists in a non-momentary or permanent condition
(nityatva), cannot bring about effects in a sequence, since this would be to produce a change
in the supposedly permanent object (before it brings about the effect E, it is not effective of
E, but afterwards, it is). Neither can it bring about the effect simultaneously, because that
would be to remove cause and effect of all intelligibility (if watering a plant is the cause of
its growth, then the plant cannot grow at the very same immediate instant as the water
touches the plant—this would essentially make its growth uncaused).59
In terms of Nyāya debate, Dharmottara is giving support (sādhana) for his position,
which is one of the requirements in discussion seen above (“supporting and criticizing is
by epistemic instruments and suppositional reasoning”). Eventually, Saṅkars.an. a explicitly
presents some competing positive claims, such as that permanent things are efficacious,
along with explicit denials of what Dharmottara has claimed, such as that momentary
things are not efficacious (Dezső 2005, p. 73). However, he does not argue in an extended
manner for a competing counter-standpoint not-p, put explicitly in contrast to Dharmot-
tara’s p. (In fact, Dharmottara argues for a conjunction of claims, p and q and etc.) In
pragma-dialectic terms, this is a multiple non-mixed critical discussion. This means that in
Nyāya terms, it is a case of wrangling (vitan. d. ā).
Finally, in the closing stage, Saṅkars.an. a asks the arbiters to decide which position is
better (Table 6). This is preceded by three different stage directions that indicate the monk
sits silently, rather than replying to his interlocutor. The arbiters have already stated, in
a declarative speech act, that Saṅkars.an. a’s reasoning has convinced them, and that, with
it, “the position of momentariness has been refuted”.60 In perhaps a sly reference to his
earlier implicit criticism of Dharmottara, they characterize Saṅkars.an. a’s speech as nı̄timārga.
Dezső translates this as “course of argumentation” (p. 81) but it perhaps has the additional
connotation of an “upright (nı̄ti) path (mārga)”. They urge him to move on to another topic,
in a directive speech act, telling him in an imperative form (abhidhatsva) to “speak” on the
topic of consciousness (p. 78).
Table 6. Closing in Act One.
Stage Example Dialogue
Closing
Stage directions: The monk draws on the ground in silence,
with eyes downcast.
Saṅkars.an. a: Honorable arbiters, tell us which one of the two
positions is superior?
Arbiters: Why are you asking us? Your position is supported
by the monk himself by his entering into silence.61
These speech acts, declaratives from the arbiters about being partially convinced and
directives urging debaters to speak or to stop speaking, were not explicitly discussed in
the Nyāyasūtra. However, Jayanta presented them as an ordinary part of a debate. In
the play, they are informed by the intersubjectively available procedural rules set out in
the opening—what pragma-dialectics would consider “conventionally valid” rules. The
arbiters rarely intervene in the debate, only in the closing when requested by Saṅkars.an. a
to fulfill their agreed-upon institutional role, and one earlier time, which I discuss below.
Once Saṅkars.an. a has set out his argumentation on consciousness, Dharmottara once
again fails to respond—an action suggesting one of the twenty-two points of defeat known
as “lack of an idea” or apratibhā, in which the interlocutor is not able to give a reply
(Todeschini 2010, p. 64). However, rather than appealing to a point of defeat as judgment
against Dharmottara, the arbiters interpret his silence as a kind of speech act. Through
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entering into a state of silence, which is presented as an action, rather than a failure to
speak, the monk implies he agrees. At least, this is the arbiters’ interpretation.
With this, the debate concludes, and Saṅkars.an. a urges the monk to take the results of
their discourse seriously: he should either abandon Buddhism, as it has been established
that its path to salvation is no such thing, or he should openly accept that he is engaged in
“snobbery and masses of blather (kaurukucı̄kūrcad. ambara-)”.62 At the close of the act, we
again see the titular Sanskrit term d. ambara (blather). Here it is reserved for the monk’s
teachings, emphasizing that they have finally been shown to be flawed.
From the Nyāya perspective previously discussed, at the conclusion of a debate, once
a standpoint has been supported and opposing views against it successfully refuted, then it
is justified. On the assumption that the inferences involved were legitimate, and not merely
apparent inferences, the standpoint is true, and the debate has enabled both participants to
become aware of its truth.
Unlike Nyāya debate theory, pragma-dialectics, as discussed earlier, does not focus
on truth explicitly, but rather acceptability. Yet in rule eight (above), we also see that only
when appropriate argument schemes are correctly used can the standpoint be considered
“concisively defended”. Similarly, rule nine governs the reasonable epistemic attitudes a
person may have after a critical discussion concludes: if a defense has been conclusive, the
standpoint cannot continue to be doubted, and if a defense has been inconclusive, that
standpoint cannot be maintained. Thus, in pragma-dialectic terms as well, Dharmottara,
with his inconclusive defense, ought to abandon his standpoint.
5. Conclusions
While Saṅkars.an. a seems to be an ardent defender of the Vedas and thus would be
a candidate for a truth-seeking debate practitioner, from what I have argued, he is more
a vaitan. d. ika, a “wrangler”, and perhaps even motivated more by a concern with victory
than defense of the truth. Before his opening confrontation with the Buddhist Dharmottara,
the Mimamsaka introduces himself by stating that his goal is to “humiliate the enemies
of the Veda”, and if he is not able to fulfill this goal, his previous studies will be all for
naught (Dezső 2005, p. 53). Here, we might think Saṅkars.an. a is less concerned with the
truth than he is in showing himself to be intelligent, in contrast to the Buddhists with
their bad reasoning (kutarka). Further supporting this interpretation, when he encounters
Dharmottara, as we have seen, his confrontation is critical, but it does not carry an explicit
counter-standpoint. In pragma-dialectical terms, the argumentation is “non-mixed”, or one
party claiming p and the other simply doubting or criticizing p.
Additionally, he violates the norms he has agreed to in the opening stage, presenting
arguments while sneering, and calling his opponent an “fool” (mud. ha).63 The latter violates
the requirement of harsh words given earlier, and while a smile may be the opposite of
furrowed brows, it suggests an envious heart, gleeful at his opponent’s inabilities. After
this exchange, Dharmottara’s watching disciple and Saṅkars.an. a’s young brahmin friend
nearly come to blows, and the arbiters, along with Dharmottara and Saṅkars.an. a must stop
the fight.
Further, as Saṅkars.an. a picks up his argumentative thread after this near fistfight, the
arbiters ask him to stop talking, saying he has done “enough with his verbosity” (kr. tam.
vistaren. a). Here he may have fallen afoul of the point of defeats above known as “excess”,
in which a person adds additional examples or a reason statement. At the very least, from
a pragmatic standpoint, he has gone beyond cooperative engagement with Dharmottara,
which requires him to ensure his contributions are all and only those which resolve the
standpoint on the merits. By swamping his opponent with excess reasons, he is being
uncooperative.
From a standpoint of the virtues of discussants, he is concerned now with his perfor-
mance, not with the persuasiveness of his argument for Dharmottara. Vācaspati Miśra
makes this point about “excess” as a point of defeat. After all, we might think that more
reasons are better, and if these are genuine reasons, they contribute to resolution of the
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issue under discussion. Certainly, they do not obstruct the resolution in the way that logical
fallacies might. However, Vācaspati says:
But the (point of defeat) “excessive”, even if there is no directly obstructing
understanding of the truth, even still, as a result of its use, the other one who
hears, whose mind is cluttered, is not able to understand the truth. Therefore,
even “the excessive” is a cause of an obstruction to understanding the truth.64
In Jayanta’s presentation, then, although Dharmottara is defeated in debate by a Mı̄
mām. saka, there are doubts about the extent to which his debate was a genuine discussion—
truth-seeking and rationally persuasive—and to what extent it was a kind of wrangling—
focusing on brow-beating his opponent into silence with an excess of argumentation and sly
language use.
However, whether Saṅkars.an. a manages to engage in discussion by Nyāya’s lights,
the play sets up the norms for its possibility in the opening charge, norms which are
more extensively discussed in Jayanta’s other works. The play shows us the range of
strategies which interlocutors can deploy in the course of a debate, which opens up choices
at different stages for responses. These strategies include more than the formal structure
of the inferences being deployed, but also the pragmatics of the speech acts in which
inferences, suppositional reasoning, and so on, are communicated. Consequently, I have
shown two main principles guiding Nyāya debate theory:
1. Truth-seeking discussion (debate) persuades interlocutors of the truth by resolving
uncertainty;
2. Discussion’s persuasive strategies are context-sensitive, thereby subject to pragmatic
analysis, but also rationally constrained, thereby subject to epistemic norms.
For early Nyāya debate theorists, especially Jayanta, the paradigmatic kind of debate,
discussion, resolves differences of opinions on the merits, but in a way which is truth-
seeking. They are attentive to the pragmatic features of debate (whether discussion or other
kinds) in their theorizing, too, showing that they do not think rhetorical persuasiveness
interferes with epistemic aims. Jayanta’s play illustrates that not only external performance
but virtuous dispositions are important for achieving these high standards, and also shows
that the boundary between discussion and wrangling is difficult to maintain.
There are two other debates in the play, and a final monologue by a Nyāya philosopher,
Dhairyarāśi, who sets out the boundaries of religious toleration in the kingdom—these
depend on what is accepted by people. According to Arnold (forthcoming), whether this
acceptance comes from great people or a great many people (the compound can be read in
two ways), acceptability need not entail rational acceptability (pp. 12–13). Arnold‘s solution
is to appeal to Bhat.t.a Mı̄mām. sā epistemology, distinguishing between subjectively-held
justification and objectively-grounded truth. Whether Mı̄mām. sā (or Nyāya) epistemology
(and which varieties therein) are successful models for addressing problems of religious
toleration is beyond this paper’s scope. From a literary and philosophical standpoint, there
are remaining questions as to why Jayanta does not present a Naiyāyika as a victorious
discussant but rather as an almost Hobbesian defender of politically expedient boundaries,
set out in a monologue in the final act. Further analysis of the structure of the other acts
of the play—and Act One in its entirety—using both pragma-dialectics and Jayanta’s
understanding of debate may prove fruitful in answering these questions.
What this paper has tried to show is that Nyāya debate is concerned with both rational
acceptability and persuasion, at the same time as it is aware that argumentation occurs in
particular contexts between individuals who have competing goals and yet agree to coop-
erate in a limited manner. We have seen that concern with justification and truth are found
together in Nyāya in debate theory, which allows for agonistic confrontation within rational
constraints. Pragma-dialectic analysis may help us further appreciate the pragmatic under-
pinnings of their concern with the performative elements of Nyāya debate, but without
leaving behind its ever-present epistemic aims. Conversely, as pragma-dialectics focuses
on acceptability and, arguably, a deficient sense of “justification”, Nyāya approaches can
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bolster its stated concern with rationality. Thus, while engaging in dispassionate discourse
may be conceptually compatible with a limited kind of agonism between virtuous persons,
when constrained by a mutual truth-seeking project, Jayanta’s play shows the difficulty of
maintaining such an adversarial position in actual argumentative contexts.
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1 For discussion of dates, see (Hacker 1951) and (Oberhammer 1962). I omit those Naiyāyikas who follow Bhasarvajña’s Nyāyasāra.
Beginning with Udayana, we might say, as Thakur (1997, p. xii) does, that a new period in Nyāya philosophy began. Given the
importance of the earlier Vātsyāyana (c. 450–500 CE) and Uddyotakara (c. 550–610), and the fact that Jayanta Bhat.t.a’s work
presupposes them, their views will also be included. However, within the space of this article, I cannot explore the full ambit of
all three philosophers and their full corpora cannot be explored within the space of this article. Further, the question of how
these thinkers developed their positions in relation to the originary sūtra text is also beyond its scope.
2 Translation adapted from (Dasti and Phillips 2017, p. 9). Unless otherwise noted, translations are by Malcolm Keating. Footnotes
have been referred to in (G. Jha 1984) for some portions of Vācaspati’s text and to (Bhattacharyya 1978) for Jayanta’s.
3 As is well-worn territory by now, jñāna is sometimes translatable as “knowledge”, a success term; although other times, it simply
means an agent’s contentful experience, whether or not it is veridical. The latter is the use in NS 1.1.2, and so “false knowledge”
would be inapt for mithyajñāna. See discussion in (Ganeri 2018).
4 Todeschini (2010, p. 50, n. 3) criticizes Matilal’s attribution of intentions to the sūtra text’s author(s) and compiler(s) as
“historically problematic”.
5 Nicholson does not discuss Jayanta Bhat.t.a, so I do not know if he would characterize him in this same manner as other
commentators. However, since he draws on the same source material and largely aligns himself with the other commentators,
especially Vācaspati Miśra on the importance of “dispassionate debate”, it is plausible that he would fall within the purview of
Nicholson’s hypothesis.
6 He mentions discussion in explaining suppositional reasoning (tarka) and implies it in relationship to certainty (nirn. aya).
7 vimr. śya paks.apratipaks. ābhyām arthāvadhāran. am. nirn. ayah. vādah. (Thakur 1996, p. 265, line 11).
8 That certainty cannot be merely psychological is suggested by Vātsyāyana’s rejection of a prima facie view at NS 1.1.41
(G. Jha 1984, vol. 1, pp. 459–60). The suggestion is that both proponent and opponent are already certain of their positions,
otherwise they would not engage in debate, and so it makes no sense to say that certainty is ascertained by discussion. Further,
there is no need for both lines of reasoning (support and criticism), since it is only the one which supports the finally established
position that is relevant. Vātsyāyana’s reply clarifies that discussion is not necessary for certainty (it can be achieved other
ways) and that certainty is the end result of not only supporting p but rejecting not-p. The idea seems to be that while both
participants are initially certain, once they enter into discussion, their certainty should rationally be undermined because they
have an opposing view. This is why Uddyotakara says that doubt comes about by controversy, and from the statement of the
opponent’s view (NV 1.1.23). Thanks to anonymous reviewers for suggesting that I develop the idea of certainty further.
9 . . . anyatarādhikaran. a-nirn. ayam antaren. a na paryavasyati nyāyoparamakāran. atvena tasya pravarttako nirn. aya itarathā niravasānam
anāsāditaphalam. ko nāma nyāyam ārabheta. (NM āhnika 1, ad NS 1.1.1, vol. 1, p. 10, lines 4–5). “ . . . Suppositional reasoning (tarka)
does not stop without certainty (nirn. aya) about the authority of one of the two positions, since certainty’s function is causing
the completion of reasoning (nyāya). On the other hand, without a limit, its result remaining unaccomplished, what person
would undertake reasoning?” and vāde tu vicāryamān. e nyāyah. sam. śayacchedanena adhyavasitāvabodham adhyavasitābhyanujñātam. ca
vidadhat tattvapariśuddhimād dhātı̄ti vı̄tarāgaih. śis.yasabrahmacāribhih. saha vādah. prayoktavyah. . (NM āhnika 1, ad NS 1.1.3, vol. 1, p. 10,
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lines 4–5). “Now, with regard to (the category of) discussion (vāda), which is deliberation: reasoning (nyāya), by removing doubt,
bestows a settled understanding and a settled agreement from considering the completely correct truth. Thus one ought to
engage in discussion with dispassionate students and peers”. NB: I correct Śukla tattvapariśuddhimādādhātı̄ti to tattvapariśuddhimād
dhātı̄ti in light of SARIT’s transliteration and the context (SARIT 2014).
10 An anonymous reviewer raises an important related question, too large to address in this context: what is the relationship
between Nyāya epistemology, debate, and what is today called “naturalized epistemology” (NE)? “Naturalized epistemology”
is an umbrella term, but typically NE holds to a rejection of the a priori/aposteriori distinction, some close relation between natural
properties and epistemic properties (whether reduction or supervenience), and the incorporating of psychology, and other
empirical sciences into the study of knowledge. If Nyāya epistemology is broadly externalist, and explains epistemic virtues in
terms of causal processes, then is it a kind of NE? Amita Chatterjee (2017) argues that Nyāya thought is a kind of moderate NE.
If it is, where does that leave rational norms? Are they explained only in terms of such processes, which might be unavailable to
a reasoner’s awareness? Work by externalists such as Goldman (1994, 2004) focuses on giving explanations for argumentation’s
rational norms in such a framework. Goldman argues that arguments (as a series of propositions) lack epistemic properties, but
rather episodes of thought bear them, and that inferential justification is a matter of “how the target belief is arrived at (or at
least causally sustained)” and not merely logical relationships among abstract propositions (Prets 2003, p. 57). If, and how, this
approach coheres with Nyāya epistemology, and its implications for argumentation is an area worth further inquiry.
11 pramān. atarkasādhanopālambhah. siddhāntāviruddhah. pañcāvayavopapannah. paks.apratipaks.aparigraho vādah. (Thakur 1996, p. 270,
lines 3–4).
12 vı̄tarāgakathā vastunirn. ayaphalā vādah. . (NM āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2, p. 8, line 1).
13 To an interlocutor inquiring when certainty arises in a discussion, Uddyotakara explains that there is no fixed point, but it
depends on whether the supports and criticisms are successful at each stage of the exchange (G. Jha 1984, p.1, line 467).
14 . . . vāde ’pi vimarśarahite bhavati nirn. ayah. ubhau niścitau vādam kurutah. sandigdhasya tatrānadhikārāt. katham. tarhi es.a pravādah.
sam. śayacchedo vādasya phalam iti. prathamam ubhayor ’pi niścitayor vādapravr. ttāv antarāle balād āpatati yuktidvayopanipātavatah.
sam. śaya iti vastunirn. ayāvasānatvād vādasya sam. śayacchedaphalatvam ācaks.ate. NM āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2, p. 149, lines 29–33.
“ . . . Even in discussion, there is certainty which is devoid of reflection, when two people who are both certain engage in
discussion, because in that case, there is no reference to something which is doubted. ‘How then is this conversation (between
certain interlocutors) an interruption of doubt, the result of discussion?’ First, even for both of those who are certain, while the
discussion is going on, doubt suddenly appears because of the strength belonging to the two arguments being deployed. Since
discussion terminates in certainty about a topic, it is said that its result is the interruption of doubt”.
15 These five components are: thesis (pratijñā), reason (hetu), illustration (udāharan. a), application (upanayana) and conclusion
(nigamana). The stock example is an inference to the existence of fire on a mountain: There is fire on the mountain (pratijñā),
because there is smoke on the mountain (hetu), and where there is smoke there is fire, just as in the kitchen and unlike the
lake (udāharan. a), and this case is like the kitchen and unlike the lake (udāharan. a), and therefore there is fire on the mountain
(nigamana).
16 “And by this [‘supporting and criticizing is by ways of knowing and suppositional reasoning’], the bringing about of insufficiency
and excess is understood, as in ‘There is insuffuciency (nyūna) by what is missing even one of the component parts’, (NS 5.2.12);
‘There is excess by what has an excess reason or example’ (NS 5.2.13)”. anena ca hı̄nam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam.
hetūdāharan. ādhikam adhikam iti nyūnādhikayor udbhāvanam anujñayate, NM āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2, p. 150, lines 26–27.
17 For more detail, see (Phillips 2017).
18 “ . . . [suppositional reasoning] has a use, whose aim is to make clarity of mind appear”, . . . āśayaśuddhipradarśanārtham upādānam
(NM āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2, p. 170, lines 14–20).
19 tarkah. sam. śyavijñānavis.ayı̄kr. tatulyakalpapaks.advayānyatarapaks.aśaithilyasamutpādanena taditarapaks.avis.ayam. pramān. am akleśasam-
padyamānapratipaks.avyudāsam anugr.hn. āti mārgaśuddhim ādadhāna iti pr. thag upadiśyate sa cāśaya śuddhim upadarśayitum. vāde
prayoks.yate iti anyatarādhikaran. anirn. ayam antaren. a na paryavasyati nyāyoparamakāran. atvena tasya pravarttako nirn. aya itarathā ni-
ravasānam anāsāditaphalam. ko nāma nyāyam ārabheta. NM āhnika 1 ad NS 1.1.1, vol. 1, p. 10, lines 20–23.
20 pratijñātārthavyatireken. ābhyupetārthaparityāgāt nigr.hyata iti. NV p. 559, line 15.
21 “This is inapt: ‘By the mention of ‘which does not contradict settled claims (siddhānta)’, there is ‘Inconsistency (apasiddhānta), the
continuation of discourse without qualification, once having accepted the settled claims’ (NS 5.2.23), thus in debate the points of
defeat called ‘in opposition to what is settled’ are to be pointed out”. siddhāntāviruddhagrahan. ena siddhāntam abhyupetya aniyamāt
kathāprasaṅgo ’pasiddhānta ity apasiddhāntākhyanigrahasthānāni vāde udbhāvyanta iti tad anupapannam. . NM, āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1,
vol. 2, p. 151, lines 1–8.
22 bhrāntyā tu katham. cit prayuktānām avaśyam udbhāvanam anudbhāvane vastupariśuddher abhāvāt. NM, āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2,
p. 151, lines 1–8.
23 “Remembering and understanding either the support or the criticism—on these points a speaker does not acquire victory, but
rather, things such as abandoning a thesis, are the whole cause for genuine victory over another—this is accepted by these
two words here (siddhāntāviruddha)”. āgatyānusmr. tya ca sādhanam upālambham. vā tatra vadan na parājı̄yate, pratijñāhānyādi tu
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samyakparājayakāran. am akhilam ābhyām. padābhyām abhyanujātam atreti. NM, āhnika 11, ad NS 1.2.1, vol. 2, p. 151, lines 9–13. See
discussion also in Solomon (1976, pp. 106–7).
24 arthavikalpair vacanavighātah. chalam. NM āhnika 1, ad NS 1.1.1, vol. 1, p. 8, line 2. Compare NS 1.2.10: vacanavighāto ’rthavikalpopatyā
chalam. He discusses the different kinds of chala in the eleventh section (āhnika), see NM vol. 2, pp. 168–72.
25 hetupratibimbanaprāyam. pratyavasthānam. jātih. . NM āhnika 1, ad NS 1.1.1, vol. 1, p. 8, lines 3–4. For further discussion, see NM
āhnika 11, vol. 2, pp. 172–90. Compare NS 1.2.18: sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām. pratyavasthānam. jātih. .
26 See (Prets 2001) for discussion of the history of jātis in early Nyāya. He argues that they are “no way futile or unsound, but
question the validity of proof in the early dialectic tradition” (p. 553).
27 For an overview of the history and major components of the pragma-dialectical approach, see (van Eemeren 2015).
28 Definitions based on discussion of these concepts especially on page 30 of van Eemeren (2018).
29 The list below is taken from Chapter 4, section 3 of (van Eemeren 2018). The following characterization of pragma-dialectics
depends on this work.
30 One starting point is the categorization of fallacies in van Eemeren (2018, pp. 66–67). This could be coupled with analyses such
as Todeschini (2010).
31 NBh on NS 1.2.1, p. 39, line 7.
32 uttarapaks.avādı̄ vaitan. d. ikah. prathamavādyprasādyamānapaks. āpeks.ayā hastipratihastinyāyena pratipaks.a ity ucyate. NM āhnika 11 on NS
1.2.3, vol. 2, p. 151, lines 8–9.
33 tam asāvabhyupagacchaty eva na tatra sādanam upadiśati parapaks.am evāks. ipann āste. NM II, 151.9–10. “With regard to that thing to
which the [destructive debater] agrees, there is no statement of support, and the counter-standpoint itself is implied”.
34 This changes after Udayana, as both Solomon (1976) and Nicholson (2010) also pointed out in their discussions.
35 NM on NS 1.2.3, vol. 2, p. 156, lines 6–19.
36 Solomon (1976, p. 117) notes that in his Nyāyapariśuddhi, the 14th century Veṅkat.anātha refers to, but does not endorse, the
distinction between a wrangler aiming at victory and one who argues dispassionately against a position without having one
of their own. Veṅkat.anātha rejects this distinction because he thinks that someone who is genuinely dispassionate (vı̄tarāga)
would not be “satisfied” with mere criticism and would instead want to reach “conviction regarding the true nature of the thing”
under discussion (p. 117). While not going so far as to endorse a necessary connection between the structure of wrangling and
the entrance of fallacious reasoning, we may be able to see a further philosophical motivation for the general Nyāya tendency
to preserve this connection, in pragma-dialectic terms. The Unexpressed Premise Rule states that participants should not
“disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises”. Since a wrangler criticizing p is implicitly committed to not-p,
we might wonder about their commitment to participation in the norms of discussion, in which one sets out beliefs openly for
investigation. Someone who seeks to conceal their commitment to not-p by not only failing to state it, but failing to argue for it,
has demonstrated a non-cooperative attitude. Thus we might think they are more likely to resist cooperation in other ways, such
as availing themselves of tricky fallacies. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing on the point of what kind of connection
there is between implicit positions and irrationality.
37 The following discussion of the play and Jayanta’s life draws on material in (Dezső 2005) and a longer introduction, (Dezső 2004).
38 For how this argument coheres with those in the NM, see (Dezső 2004, pp. xxi–xxiii).
39 . . . eva cānytarapaks.anirn. ayāvasāna eva bhavati vādah. , na jalpavadalı̄kadūs.an. ad. ambaraviracitaparaparibhavaparyavasāno ’pı̄ti tathā
buddhipūrvam ābhāsānām aprayoga iti nirmatsarakathātvam asyoktam. (NM āhnika 11, vol. 2, p. 151, lines 18–22). The larger context
of the quote is about how to understand the reference to suppositional reasoning and epistemic instruments in the sūtra.
40 jalpavitan. d. e tu dus. t.atārkikoparacitakapat.adūs. an. ād. ambarasantrāsyamānasaralam atisamāśvāsanena taddhr.dayasthatattvajñānasam. raks.an. āya
kvacid avasare vı̄tarāgasyāpy apayujyete iti vaks. āmah. . NM āhnika 1, vol. 1, p. 10, lines 23–25.
41 (Dezső 2005, pp. 64–65.) Note that in the edition, Sanskrit is always printed on even page numbers and the English translation
on odd.
42 Translations and page numbers are Dezső (2005) unless otherwise noted.
43 Dezső translates pralāpa as “raving”, but I use “gibberish” as it connotes nonsense and lacks the emotive connotations of
“raving”.
44 In his play, Jayanta omits controversy over what constitute points of defeat and in what contexts, a controversy which we find in
Buddhist texts especially, such as the Vādanyāya of Dharmakı̄rti. Thus we might imagine that, in reality, a Buddhist might not be
in agreement about the rules of debate—both their problem and conventional validity in pragma-dialectic terms.
45 For further discussion, see (Das 2020). He translates Uddyotakara’s definition of envy (p. 817): “Envy is the desire to thwart
the adherence (abhiniveśa) of others to a common object; the desire to thwart the adherence of others to that which is common,
i.e., unacquired by anyone, is envy”. In contrast, I would take Uddyotakara as talking about the possession of (abhiniveśa),
rather than “adherence to”, a common object. In the context of discussion (vāda), that “object” is the truth, and, consistent with
Jayanta’s idea that ignorance is the ground of both envy and desire, we might hypothesize that the mistaken conception of truth
as something one can possess motivates such envy. See (V. N. Jha 2018, p. 39) for Jayanta’s remarks.
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46 Gascón (2017) argues that while pragma-dialectic focus on participants’ behavior, “certain aspects concerning the psychological
states of the arguers, even though they may not be relevant to the evaluation of argumentative discourse [italics original], are
nevertheless very important to the practice of argumentation” (p. 710). He suggests that certain virtues may need to be present
in order for agents to be able to follow the pragma-dialectical “ten commandments” (discussed above).
47 The point of defeat known as non-reiteration (ananubhās.an. a) is discussed at NS 5.2.16.
48 Literature on quotation is vast. For a starting-point, see (Cappelen et al. 2020).
49 See the endnotes in (Dezső 2005) for discussion of where these ideas are found. The summary in the play is “Suffering; its cause
and its cessation; the path to attain that, called ‘the realization of having no Self’; this is established through the establishing of
momentariness. Things are momentary because they exist, and since their destruction requires no cause. Activities such as
memory are possible because of causal relations in the continuum. But no external thing, even if it were momentary, can become
the object of cognition. This consciousness alone shines forth, studded with a multitude of forms. Therefore everything is empty,
everything is momentary, everything lacks an enduring essence, everything is suffering. Meditating thus one reaches Nirvana”
(Dezső 2005, p. 67).
50 Translation adapted from Dezső (2005, p. 67). Sanskrit: duh. kham tasya nimittam taduparamas tadupapattaye mārgah. nairātmyadarśanā-
khyas tatsiddhih. ks.an. ikatāsiddeh. (p. 66).
51 Translation mine. ayam. yathoktah. ks.an. abhangasiddhau satyām bhaved apy apavargamārgah vicāryamān. ās tu na naipun. ena spr. śanti
bhāvāh. ks.an. abhaṅguratvam. (Dezső 2005, p. 68.)
52 Translation by Malcolm Keating. hetvabhāvād eva. nanūkto hetuh. sattvāt iti (Dezső 2005, p. 68.)
53 Further discussion on rhetorical questions in pragma-dialectics, see (Snoeck Henkemans 2009).
54 Dezső (2005, p. 273), note 1.140 explains this in detail.
55 Dharmottara himself responds to this same charge in his Establishing Momentariness (Ks.an. abhaṅgasiddhi). See (Masamichi 2010)
for discussion. See (Frauwallner 1935) for full translation of the text.
56 Translation by Malcolm Keating. (Dezső 2005, p. 68).
57 Translation by Malcolm Keating. (Ibid.)
58 Translation by Malcolm Keating. (Ibid.)
59 (R. Gupta 1980, p. 48) has a nice illustration of this reasoning, focusing on Dharmakı̄rti’s Hetubindu.
60 tena vyudastah. ks.an. abhaṅgavādo. (Dezső 2005, p. 78).
61 Translation adapted from (Dezső 2005, p. 81).
62 The first word, kaurukucı̄, which is slightly unusual, probably alludes to Buddhist monastic codes which earlier in the play have
been criticized as not actually being followed. The literal meaning may be “distorting one’s face when an acrid or pungent thing
is tasted” (Agrawala 1966, p. 70).
63 The stage instructions say sasmitam (“with a smile”) and sopahāsam (“with a sneer”). (Dezső 2005, pp. 74–75).
64 adhikam. tu na yadyapi tattvapratipattim. sāks. ād vyāhanti, tathāpi tatprayojanānusaran. e parah. pratipattā samākulitabuddhir na tattvam.
pratipattum arhatı̄ty adhikasyāpi tattvapratipattivighātahetutvam. NVTT. ad NS 1.2.1, p. 272, line 23 to p. 273, line 2.
References
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